Abstract-We study the composition of security protocols when protocols share secrets such as keys.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security protocols aim at ensuring security properties (for example confidentiality or authentication) of communications over public networks. Their design is error-prone due to the fact that they are used in arbitrary environments, with possibly malicious behaviors. It is known for example that a small variation in the design of a protocol may open the way to an attack (see e.g. [1] ).
Formal methods have demonstrated their usefulness when designing and analyzing security protocols. They indeed provide rigorous frameworks and techniques that have led to the discovery of new flaws [1] , [2] , [3] and to careful security analysis (see e.g. [4] , [5] ). While insecurity is undecidable in general [6] , several decision procedures (sometimes incomplete) have been proposed for automatically analyzing the security of protocols. For example, checking secrecy and authentication-like properties has been shown to be NPcomplete [7] for a bounded number of sessions. Blanchet has developed a procedure based on clause resolution [8] for analyzing protocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Several tools [9] , [3] , [10] have been developed and successfully applied to checking the security of protocols.
However, most of existing techniques are dedicated to the analysis of a single protocol, without taking into account other protocols which may be used at the same time.
This is unrealistic for several reasons. Firstly, a number of protocols are verified under the assumption that agents share some pre-distributed keys (e.g. public keys or symmetric keys between agents and servers). But these keys might have been established by some other sub-protocols. There is no guarantee that a protocol remains secure if a specific keyexchange protocol is used to establish the keys, even if both protocols have been proven secure in isolation.
Secondly, even apparently isolated protocols might interact in unexpected ways. For example, a user might choose the same password for two different network services, or a server might use the same key for different protocols. Even if the network services (or the different protocols) were proven secure in isolation, there is no security guarantee which carries over when they share keys or passwords.
Furthermore, even assuming that we can produce a global model of all protocols which are used in a certain setting, it might be unrealistic to formally verify such a collection of protocols in its entirety due to computational constraints.
Therefore more modular reasoning about security is desirable, where we can infer security guarantees for the composition of protocols from the security guarantees of the individual protocols.
The goal of our paper is to study the composition of protocols. We use composition to refer to arbitrary ways of interleaving protocols, in particular in parallel or sequentially. For example, given a protocol P 1 that has been proven secure assuming pre-established keys or assuming some secure channel, we wish to study under which conditions P 1 remains secure if it uses P 2 as a sub-protocol to establish some of keys.
Our contributions. We propose a generic composition result for arbitrary cryptographic primitives which can be modeled by equational theories. More precisely, we show that an attack trace against the composition of two protocols can be transformed into an attack trace on one of the two protocols. For the clarity of the exposition we concentrate on secrecy properties although we believe that our result carries over to other trace properties such as authentication.
Our main theorem is generic in the sense that the composition can be any interleaving of actions from the two protocols: for example, the composition can be parallel or sequential, possibly with nested replication. In particular, we capture the case where a protocol uses a sub-protocol to e.g. establish keys.
The composition theorem holds for any cryptographic primitives which can be modeled by equational theories, provided that the signatures of the two composed protocols are disjoint. This allows us to handle many cryptographic primitives such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hash functions, messages authentication codes, signatures, blind signatures, re-encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and others [11] , [12] . We can also allow some common primitives between the two protocols, such as encryption and hash, provided that they are tagged.
As a consequence, we can for example easily compose a protocol using Diffie-Hellman exponentiation for establishing symmetric keys, together with any protocol making use of pre-established keys.
Applications. Our main composition result can be used in different contexts. As an application, we study the case of key-exchange protocols. We first consider the case where a key-exchange protocol is used to establish shared long-term keys. Assume that P = νn · (P 1 | P 2 ) is a protocol that establishes a key between two participants. P 1 intuitively denotes the first participant, P 2 denotes the second participants, | denotes the fact that P 1 and P 2 run in parallel, · denote sequential composition and νn means that P 1 and P 2 share some secret n. The role of P is to establish a shared key between P 1 and P 2 . Assume that the key will be stored in the variable y 1 for P 1 and in the variable y 2 for P 2 .
An important question is the following one: which properties should be satisfied by P in order to be safely used within any other protocol? As expected, we retrieve the fact that the established key (stored in y 1 for P 1 and in y 2 for P 2 ) should remain secret to an attacker, but we also point out two other important properties which are not always checked in security proofs of the literature.
We show that whenever P satisfies our identified properties and whenever a protocol Q is secure assuming preestablished keys (e.g. if Q preserves the secrecy of some data s):
then Q remains secure when running P as subprotocol for establishing the secret key (in y 1 for the first participant and in y 2 for the second participant):
We also consider the case where a key-exchange protocol is used within each session for establishing a secure channel.
We show that if a protocol Q is secure assuming a secure channel:
then Q remains secure when running P as subprotocol:
We describe our setting in Section II. We state our generic composition theorem in Section III, providing counterexamples when protocols are not carefully composed. In Section IV, we illustrate our main theorem with the case of key-exchange protocols. We explain how to compose protocols with common tagged primitives in Section V. We discuss related work in Section VI. Omitted proofs can be found in our corresponding research report [13] .
II. MODEL
We first introduce a process algebra for security properties. The process algebra closest to ours is the applied π-calculus [14] . However, the applied π-calculus is not adequate in our case since it makes formulating our main theorem unnecessarily cumbersome. The main differences between our calculus and the applied π-calculus are the following ones:
• we add a synchronization phase, so that we can write P ·Q for arbitrary processes P and Q. This is important to express the fact that a protocol first runs P before continuing with Q, • we consider only one public channel, • only positive tests are allowed (no else branches).
A. Terms and deduction
The process algebra is parametrized by a signature F which associates to each function symbol f its arity ar(f ). We assume that the signature contains at least a (regular) constant function symbol and that it contains a countably infinite set N of special constant symbols, which we call names and which are used to represent data freshly generated during protocol executions. We also assume a countably infinite set of variables X all = X ∪ X w , disjoint from F and such that X and X w are disjoint countably infinite sets. Intuitively, the variables of X will be used to describe the variables instantiated by the protocols while the variables of X w will be used to store the messages sent on the network.
The set of terms over a signature F and a set of variables X is denoted by T (F, X ) and is defined as follows:
A term is ground if it contains no variable. As usual, we denote by {x 1 → t 1 , . . . , x k → t k } the substitution σ that replaces the variable x i with the term t i . The
The substitution σ is ground if each t i is ground. We let E = {l i = r i } i∈{1,...,n} be an equational theory, where
are not allowed to contain names. We say that two terms s and t are equal in the equational theory E and we write s = E t if s = t is a consequence of E in the first order theory of equality. We denote by [t] =E the equivalence class of a term t modulo E. Note that such an equational theory is stable by replacement of names by arbitrary terms. We write u ∈ E S if there exists t ∈ S such that u = E t. Given a finite set S, its cardinality is denoted by |S|.
Processes are executed within an environment formed of a frame ϕ that contains messages sent over the network (as in the applied π-calculus) and a binding substitution σ whose domain is a subset of the free variables of the process.
In what follows, we always assume a frame ϕ to be a ground substitution whose domain is included in X w . An equational theory typically describes the properties of the primitives and defines what an attacker can deduce from a set of messages, represented by a frame.
Definition 1 (deduction):
Let ϕ be a frame. We say that t ∈ T (F) is deducible from ϕ with recipe r ∈ T (F \ N , dom(ϕ)) in the equational theory E and we write ϕ r E t if rϕ = E t. If E is clear from context, we write only r instead of r E . If we are not interested in the exact value of the recipe r, we also write E or (if the equational theory is clear from context).
Note that we assume that during the deduction phase the intruder does not have access to the infinite set of names. This is not a restriction in our case, since we will only allow positive tests in processes; so the intruder can simply use any term in place of the names.
Example 1: Let F DH = {f, g, mac, n I } ∪ N be a signature where f and g are of arity 1 while mac is of arity 2 and n I is of arity 0 (n I represents a public data). Together with the equational theory
, y)} the function symbols f and g model the Diffie-Hellman primitives (f (x, y) = x y mod p, g(y) = α y mod p for a generator α) while mac denotes a keyed hash function.
Let
Example 2: A classical example is the modeling of symmetric encryption. Let F enc = {dec, enc, m I } ∪ N be a signature where dec and enc are of arity 2 and represent respectively the decryption and encryption operator. m I is of arity 0 and represents some public data. As usual, we may write {m} k instead of enc(m, k).
The standard property of symmetric encryption/decryption is represented by the equational theory
B. Combination of equational theories
To prove our composition result for security protocols, we make use of some notions and results in term rewriting for disjoint equational theories. We recall here these notions and results.
Let F a and F b be two disjoint signatures and let E a and E b be two nontrivial equational theories over F a and respectively F b . Let E = E a ∪ E b . If c ∈ {a, b}, byc we will denote the only element of the singleton set {a, b} \ {c}.
Definition 2 (pure term, pure context): We say that a term
where C is a pure F ccontext and root(s j ) ∈ Fc, we write t = C[[s 1 , . . . , s n ]] and we say that s 1 , . . . , s n are the alien subterms of t. Note that C and s 1 , . . . , s n are uniquely determined and that C cannot the empty context (at least the root symbol of t is in C).
We define a function 'collapse' which associates to any term t a collapsed term s such that s = E t. The collapsed version of a term serves as a kind of "normal form" of the term.
Definition 4 (collapse):
If there are several values j which satisfy the condition, we choose the minimal such j. The choice of j does not influence our results, but it makes the function collapse determined, which eases the proofs. 2) otherwise, if there exists no such j, we define
If t = collapse(t), then we say that t is collapsed.
Proposition 1:
All alien subterms of a collapsed term are collapsed.
The proof can be found in our research report [13] .
where n [sj ]≡ are names not appearing in t 1 or t 2 .
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 9.4.2, Chapter 9 (Combination Problems), Page 216 from [15] .
Lemma 2: If s 1 , . . . , s k , s 1 , . . . , s l are collapsed terms with the root symbols from F c and C, D are both pure Fccontexts, we have that
Proof: By case analysis on the definition of collapse and application of Lemma 1.
Proof: Immediate by Lemma 1.
C. Process algebra
Definition 5: Processes are defined inductively as follows:
The process 0 does nothing. The process νx binds x to a fresh name. The process in(x) reads a term t from the public channel, and binds x to t. The assignment process (x := t) instantiates x with t. The process out(t) outputs the term t on the public channel. The test process [s = t] blocks if s = E t and does nothing otherwise. The sequential composition process P · Q executes P followed by Q. The parallel composition process (P | Q) runs P and Q in parallel. The replication process !P will act as an infinite number of P s in parallel. We may write ν{x 1 , . . . , x k } instead of νx 1 . · · · .νx k .
We assume that ! binds strongest, followed by | and then by ·. We assume that the variables introduced by νx, in(x) and (x := t) are bound throughout sequential composition · as far to the right as possible. We identify processes up to α-renaming of bound variables and up to the following structural equivalence rules:
The operational semantics is given by the transition relations → and t → (where t a term) described in Figure 1 
→.
Example 3: Continuing Example 1, P DH = νx k · (P 1 | P 2 ) models for the Diffie-Hellman protocol where
The process P 1 DH models the first participant in an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange while P 2 DH models the second participant. The free variable x k should be previously shared by the two participants to ensure authentication.
Examples of process executions can be found in the next section.
We conclude this section by defining secrecy and freshness. Intuitively, a variable is secret if in any protocol execution, its instantiation remains not deducible.
Definition 6 (secrecy):
We say that a process P preserves the secrecy of x ∈ vars(P ) in the equational theory E, and we denote it by P |= E Secret(x), if whenever
we have that ϕ E xσ.
Definition 7 ( freshness):
We say that a process P guarantees the freshness of x ∈ vars(P ) w.r.t. {y 1 , . . . , y k } ⊆ vars(P ) in the equational theory E if whenever
we have that xσ = E y i σ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
In the above definitions we assume that the variables in the processes have been conveniently α-renamed before application of the definition. If the above definitions concern variables appearing under replications, we assume that the conditions hold for any of the variables denoted by x (and resp. y 1 , . . . , y k ). This can be achieved formally by coloring all bound variables with different colors; whenever a variable is α-renamed it preserves its color. We would then say that a certain color c is secret when all variables colored with c remain secret. As this technicality is not essential in our approach, we prefer to use the less formal version.
III. COMPOSING PROCESSES

A. Difficulties
Of course, two protocols P, Q cannot in general be (securely) composed in arbitrary ways. We illustrate several cases where composing two secure protocols yields an attack. For readability, in this section we use the notation {s} t for the term enc(s, t).
Revealing shared keys.
If a protocol P is establishing a (secret) key k, then a protocol Q using the key k should not reveal it. This would clearly compromise the security of P but it could also compromise the security of Q. Assume for example that a protocol P 1 (playing the role of P above) generates two fresh (secret) data x and y and reveals the encryption of x under y:
Note that P 1 may compute x and y in a more complicated way, but we consider just the rather trivial case where x and y are instantiated by fresh nonces for the sake of clarity. Then P 1 preserves the secrecy of both x and y. Assume now that a process Q 1 (playing the role of Q above) reveals y and uses x for encrypting a secret z:
Then νx · νy · (x := x ) · (y := y ) · Q 1 preserves the secrecy of z, while the composition P 1 ·Q 1 of both processes does not preserve the secrecy of z. Indeed
We have ϕ dec(w3,dec(w1,w2)) Eenc zσ and thus
Note that this attack works even if P 1 and Q 1 actually use different encryption symbols (thus even if they use disjoint signatures).
Sharing primitives.
The interaction of two protocols using common primitives may yield an attack, even if each of the protocols is secure when executed in isolation. Indeed, consider again the process P 1 described above and let Q 2 be a process that uses x for encrypting a secret z and outputs m for any m received under the encryption of y.
Then νx ·νy ·(x := x )·(y := y )·Q 2 preserves the secrecy of z, while the composition P 1 · Q 2 of both processes does not preserve the secrecy of z. Indeed
where σ has been defined above and
So in what follows we assume that the composed protocols use disjoint primitives. In Section V, we extend our result to the case where protocols may share some primitives such as encryption and hash, provided they are tagged.
Key freshness.
It is important that shared variables (that are assumed to be fresh) are indeed instantiated by fresh values.
Assume for example that a protocol R is composed of three phases:
• it first generates a fresh key x: let R 1 = νx;
• it then runs a sub-protocol P to establish some secret y;
• it outputs a fresh value z if x = y:
Then R is a secure protocol if y is a fresh key:
while it is not secure for all sub-protocols P establishing a secret key y. Indeed, let P = (y := x). Then νk · (x := k)·P preserves the secrecy of the shared key y but, because y is not fresh,
In what follows, we will see that the counter-examples mentioned here are actually the only problematic cases. So we will require in our composition theorem that sub-protocols do not introduce equalities between shared variables.
B. Composition theorem
In order to state our composition theorem in a general way, we simply need to show that any execution trace on two combined processes can be transformed into an execution trace on one of the two processes. Then a trace of the composition leading to an attack can be transformed into a trace of one of the individual protocols leading to an attack.
Since an execution trace involves only a finite number of replications and determines the scheduling in parallel composition, we simply need to state our main result on linear processes, that is processes that contain neither parallel composition nor replication. We say that a process is atomic if it is linear and if it does not contain the sequencing operator ·. As illustrated in Section IV, our theorem can of course be applied to compose processes with arbitrary replications and parallel compositions.
Let P = P 1 · . . . · P n be a linear process over F a with free variables {x 1 , . . . , x p } where P i is an atomic process (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let Q = Q 1 · . . . · Q m be a linear process over F b with free variables {y 1 , . . . , y q } where Q i is an atomic process (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Intuitively, the free variables of Q are established by P and conversely, the free variables of P are established by Q.
. . , Q m } (as multiset equality). We consider R a copy of R where the shared variables of P and Q are duplicated. More precisely, let R = R 1 · . . . · R n+m be such that 1) R i = P j {x → x a } if R i is P j for some j and where x ranges over all variables in P j 2) R i = Q j {x → x b } if R i is Q j for some j and where x ranges over all variables in Q j We consider an execution of the composition of P and Q.
where § is a recipe r k+1 if the last action was an input and then empty string otherwise. Assume w.l.o.g. that x 1 , . . . , x p are the variables from {x 1 , . . . , x p } which appear in dom(σ 0 ) and that y 1 , . . . , y q are the variables from {y 1 , . . . , y p } which appear in dom(σ 0 ). This means that x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q are the shared variables which were instantiated before the last action of the execution.
Let {z [xiσ0]= E } and {z [yiσ0]= E } be fresh variables and let
R corresponds to an interleaving of P and Q where P and Q do not share any variable anymore (since they are duplicated) and where the previously shared variables are instantiated by fresh distinct names. Note that whenever the execution of R instantiates two shared variables by the same value (e.g. x i σ = x j σ) then the (duplicated version of) x i and x j are instantiated in R by the same fresh name. This corresponds e.g. to the case where the same key is distributed among several participants (thus is assigned to distinct variables).
We are now ready to state our main theorem which says that we can mimic on R the execution trace of R (see Equation 1) unless P or Q do not preserve the secrecy or the freshness of the shared variables.
Theorem 1: Assume ϕ 0 t for any t ∈ {x 1 σ 0 , . . . , x p σ 0 , y 1 σ 0 , . . . , y q σ 0 } and that x i σ 0 = E y j σ 0 for all x i , y j ∈ dom(σ 0 ). Then there exist S , ϕ , σ such that
and 1) if ϕ t for some t ∈ {x i σ,
Intuitively, R is a composition of P and Q where the two process do not share variables anymore. Theorem 1 says that we can mimic on R the execution trace of R unless R reveals a shared variable, in which case R reveals some (duplicated) shared variable as well. It will be used in the next section to conclude that one of the two processes P or Q (executed alone) reveals one of its (shared) variables thus is not secure. Indeed, assume w.l.o.g. that R reveals the variable x a i . Since R corresponds to P executed in parallel (and independently) of Q, the process Q can be entirely simulated by the adversary thus P reveals x i , that is P |= E Secret(x i ).
The second condition is important to be able to completely separate the processes P and Q in R : as the variable x a i
(1 ≤ i ≤ p ) and y b i (1 ≤ i ≤ q ) are instantiated in the process R by fresh names such that x a i and y b j receive the same name if x i σ = E y j σ, it is important that such an equality does not happen. Otherwise, the two processes still share data and therefore we cannot conclude about either of them individually.
We now prove Theorem 1:
be fresh names. Let V c (c ∈ {a, b}) be functions on terms defined as follows:
The purpose of V a (resp. V b ) is to replace the keys created by the process P (resp. Q) with fresh names such that equalities between terms are preserved. We have that V c (c ∈ {a, b}) preserve equalities between terms:
Claim 1: If t 1 , t 2 are collapsed terms such that
This claim is proved in our research report [13] . We now use the functions V c (c ∈ {a, b} to construct the run in Equation 2 from the run in Equation 1 .
Let σ be defined as follows:
We proceed in two phases. In Phase 1, we show that Equation 2 holds. In Phase 2, we show that the Items 1, 2 and 3 from the conclusion are true.
Phase 1. We prove, by induction on the number of transitions, that the transitions in Equation 2 hold for the σ and ϕ that we have defined and for some S we do not care about. For each transition we do a case-by-case analysis:
1) (tests work) if the transition is a test [M = N ] in R coming from P or Q. We assume w.l.o.g. that it comes from P (otherwise conclude by symmetry). Then M and N are pure a-terms. We have to prove
a } and where x ranges over variables in M and respectively N . By definition of M , N , σ and V a we have that
where C, D are a-contexts and s 1 , . . . , s u , t 1 , . . . , t v are b-terms (C, D, s i , t j are uniquely determined -C and D might be ). Because C and D are pure F a -contexts, they contain all of M and respectively N and therefore it follows that s i and t j must be subterms of σ. Therefore s i and t j are collapsed by Proposition 1. As C[s 1 , . . . , s u ] = Mσ = E Nσ = D[t 1 , . . . , t v ], we can apply Lemma 2 to conclude that
. Therefore, by applying the substitution τ = {n [t]= E → V a (t)}, where t ranges over {s 1 , . . . , s u , t 1 , . . . , t v }, to Equation 3, we obtain
which is exactly M σ = E N σ . 2) (inputs work) if the transition is the i-th input in(x) in R (coming from P (resp. Q)) we prove that
, . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q }σ 0 . Assume that rϕ ∈ E {x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q }σ 0 or that root(rϕ) ∈ F c . We show by structural induction on (the pure layers of) r that Claim 2: V c (rϕ) = E V c (collapse(rϕ)) and that collapse(rϕ) is a good term. This claim is proved in our research report [13] . We are now ready to show that "inputs work", namely that xσ = E r i ϕ implies
As the input we are handling is one of the transitions in Equation 1, it follows that r i is a recipe over ϕ 0 (because there is no transition after ϕ). Therefore, by the hypothesis, r i ϕ = r i ϕ 0 cannot be a shared secret in (and neither can the subrecipes of r i instantiated by ϕ) in {x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q }σ 0 . By the definition of σ and ϕ , we have that
and that
In Equation 6 , it does not matter if we have an a or a b as the subscript of V since r i ϕ cannot be a shared secret in {x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q }σ 0 . From our hypothesis xσ = E r i ϕ and as r i ϕ = E collapse(r i ϕ) we have that
by Claim 1. But combining this last equality with
(which is immediate by Claim 2), we obtain V a (xσ) = E V a (r i ϕ). We combine this with Equations 5 and 6 to immediately derive Equation 4, which concludes the proof of this item. 3) (news work) if the transition is some νx in R , we have that σ (x) is a fresh name. For processes νx in R but not in R, we have that xσ = n is a fresh name by the choice of n . For processes νx a in R coming from P (for processes νx b coming from Q the proof is analogous) we distinguish two cases: a) either x a is a shared variable from {y 1 , . . . , y q }, in which case x a σ is a name from F a . Therefore
4) (outputs work) if the transition is the ith out(t) in R , we have that w i+1 ϕ = t σ . This is immediate by definition of ϕ . 5) (old assignments work) if the transition is an assignment x := t in R coming from P (resp. Q) we have that
where y ranges over all variables in t, Let M = x, N = t, M = x a and N = t (resp. M = x b and N = x b ). Then this proof can be seen as an instance of the proof for Item 1 (tests work). 6) (new assignments work) if the transition is an assignment x := t in R" that did not come from P or Q: We show that for j ∈ {1, . . . , p } (resp. j ∈ {1, . . . , p }) (i.e. for all assignments x
It is sufficient to prove that root(x j σ 0 ) ∈ F b (resp. root(y j σ 0 ) ∈ F a ), since then, by the definition of V c , we have x
We prove something stronger by induction on the transitions in Equation 1 .
, where σ 1 = ∅, ϕ 1 = ∅, R n = S, ϕ = ϕ n , σ = σ n and § i is either some recipe r j or the empty string, be the transitions in Equation 1. Definition 9: We say that a collapsed term t is i-good if one of the following conditions holds inductively: a) there exists x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q } ∩ dom(σ i ) such that t = xσ b) t is deducible from ϕ i and t = C[[t 1 , . . . ,
for some i-good terms t 1 , . . . , t k . Claim 3: For i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we have that collapse(w j ϕ i ) (for all w j ∈ dom(ϕ i )) is an i-good term and xσ i = C[s 1 , . . . , s k ] (for all x ∈ dom(σ i )) for a pure (possibly empty) F c -context C and i − 1-good terms s 1 , . . . , s k (with root(s j ) ∈ Fc), where c = a if x ∈ vars(P ) \ {x 1 , . . . , x p } and c = b if x ∈ vars(Q) \ {y 1 , . . . , y q }. This claim is proved in our research report [13] . Using Claim 3, it is now easy to prove by well founded induction on 1 ≤ i ≤ p that root(x i σ) ∈ F b . Phase 2. We have shown in Phase 1 that Equation 2 holds for our definition of σ and ϕ . We show now that each item in the conclusion of the theorem holds. 1) if ϕ t for some t ∈ {x 1 σ, . . . , x p σ, y 1 σ, . . . , y q σ}, then ϕ s for some s ∈ {x q σ } Suppose r is a minimal recipe such that rϕ is a shared secret. Then none of the subrecipes of r, instantiated by ϕ, can be shared secrets in {x 1 , . . . , x p , y 1 , . . . , y q }σ 0 . Assume w.l.o.g. that the shared secret is an x j σ = E rϕ. Let c be such that root(rϕ) ∈ F c . We know that x c j σ = V c (x j σ) by definition. We also know by Claim 1 that V c (x j σ) = E V c (collapse(rϕ)) (because collapse(rϕ) = E rϕ = E x j σ). Therefore x c j σ = E V c (collapse(rϕ)). But by Claim 2, we have that V c (rϕ) = E V c (collapse(rϕ)) and therefore x c j σ = E V c (rϕ). But V c (rϕ) is, by the definition of ϕ , equal to rϕ . Therefore we can chose s = x c j σ = E rϕ which is deducible and we conclude this item. 2) if there exist i, j such that x i ∈ dom(σ) and y j ∈ dom(σ) and x i σ = E y j σ then x 3) otherwise, if ϕ xσ for some variable x ∈ vars(P ) then ϕ x a σ (the case with Q is symmetric) Let r be a recipe for xσ. As no shared secret is deducible (otherwise we would be in the case of Item 1) we can apply Claim 2 to obtain that
By definition x a σ = V a (xσ). But V a (xσ) = E V a (collapse(rϕ)) = E V a (rϕ) = rϕ . Therefore we obtain x a σ = E rϕ , which means x a σ is deducible.
C. Some further useful lemmas
Theorem 1 is our key result for composing processes. We list here some other useful (and rather straightforward) results that we will use to show how to securely compose processes.
Theorem 1 is stated for linear processes. Given an arbitrary process P , we say that Figure 2 . Intuitively, a linearization of P is
a symbolic partial trace of P . We denote by L(P ) the set of linearizations of P . It intuitively consists of the set of all possible interleaving for the executions of P . We will use this set for reasoning about protocols containing parallel composition and replications.
A process P preserves a secret if and only if all its linearizations preserve the secret.
Lemma 4:
Let P be a process. Then for any equational theory E, P |= E Secret(x) iff for all Q ∈ L(P ) we have that Q |= E Secret(x).
Proof: By induction on the number of transitions and case analysis.
One can also notice that if a protocol reveals a secret then it a fortiori reveals it when two names become equal.
Lemma 5: For any equational theory
Proof: By induction on the number of transitions in the trace leading to the revelation of x.
We also need to show that, when mounting an attack on a process P on the signature F a , the adversary is not more powerful when using the combined theory E a ∪ E b . This is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 6:
If P is a linear process over F a and
for some ϕ n , σ n and § such that ϕ n E xσ n implies ϕ n Ea xσ n and xσ n = E yσ n implies xσ n = Ea yσ n for all x, y ∈ dom(σ n ).
Note that this lemma relies on the assumption we made that E b is not trivial (it does not equate all terms). Otherwise E a ∪ E b would be trivial and therefore all terms would be deducible. Even though the intuition behind this lemma is straightforward, the proof is rather technical (available in our research report [13] ).
From the above lemma, we immediately obtain: Corollary 1: If P is a process over F a and P |= Ea Secret(x), then P |= E Secret(x).
IV. APPLICATIONS
We now show how to apply our composition theorem in several contexts.
A. Key-exchange protocol
It is often the case that a security protocol is verified assuming that some keys are already shared between the principals, abstracting away from the process by which these keys have been established. We can use our result to show that if a key exchange protocol was used to establish a shared key and if the two protocols use disjoint cryptographic primitives, their composition is secure provided that neither the key exchange protocol nor the main protocol reveal the established keys.
To state our result, we first need the following definition:
Definition 10: We say that P binds x if P = P 1 · P 2 · . . . · P n and P j ∈ {in(x), x := t, νx} for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n and some term t (note that P 1 , . . . , P n are not necessarily atomic).
Theorem 2: Let P = νk 1 ·. . .·νk n ·(P 1 | P 2 ) be a process over F a and let Q = νk · (x k := k · Q 1 | y k := k · Q 2 ) be a process over F b such that:
• P 1 binds x k and P 2 binds y k
Intuitively, the protocol P corresponds to two roles P 1 and P 2 that establish a key k stored respectively in x k for P 1 and in y k for P 2 . Then each of the two roles Q 1 and Q 2 of Q uses respectively its version of the key. Theorem 2 ensures that the protocol P can be safely abstracted by the generation of a single fresh key, distributed among the participants.
This result could easily be extended to an arbitrary number of roles. Note that Q 1 and Q 2 may contain replications thus the key k may be used in several distinct sessions.
Proof: If c ∈ {a, b} and if P is a process, we denote by P c the process in which any occurrence of a variable x ∈ vars(P ) has been replaced by the variable x a . We do a proof by contradiction. We assume that W |= E Secret(x s ). Then, by Lemma 4, we have that there exists a linearization R of W such that R |= E Secret(x s ).
R is then a ground interleaving of a linearization P 0 ∈ L(P ) and a linearization Q 0 ∈ L(Q 1 | Q 2 ). We denote by R the same ground interleaving of P a 0 and Q b 0 . As R |= E Secret(x s ), there is a trace
We can then apply Theorem 1 to obtain that the process 
can be simulated by the adversary and thus
By Corollary 1, we obtain that P |= Ea Secret(z) for some z ∈ {x k , y k } or that Q |= E b Secret(z) for some z ∈ {x k , y k , x s }. In both cases, this contradicts the hypotheses. We thus deduce that W |= E Secret(x s ).
B. Secure channels
Another composition scenario is when a protocol is proven secure assuming some secure channels, that is, assuming that some secret key is established on the fly. We show that the secure channel can be implemented by any sub-protocol provided that neither the main protocol nor the sub-protocol reveal the key.
Theorem 3: Let
Compared to Theorem 2, the two roles Q 1 and Q 2 now use a different key k in each session.
Proof: We prove the result by contradiction along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2. We assume that W |= E Secret(x s ). Then, by Lemma 4, we have that there exists a linearization R of W such that R |= E Secret(x s ).
R is then a ground interleaving of a linearization P 0 ∈ L(P ) and a linearization Q 0 ∈ L(!(Q 1 | Q 2 )). We denote by R the same ground interleaving of P a 0 and Q b 0 . As R |= E Secret(x s ), there is a trace
Example 4:
Consider the process P DH defined in Example 3, over the signature F DH . Consider any other protocol
that models a protocol in which a participant Q 1 sends a secret x s to the second participant using a shared key y k . Assume that Q is defined over the signature F enc and that Q |= Eenc Secret(x s ). Then the sequential composition of P DH and Q, where P DH is used to establish the shared key used in Q is defined by
Tagging is a syntactic transformation of a protocol in order, for example, to make it more resistant against attacks. Many ways to tag protocols have been proposed in different contexts, e.g. for composing protocols [16] , [17] as discussed in introduction, to facilitate their analysis [18] , [19] or to prevent type-flow attacks [20] . Typically, tagging a security protocol consists in appending a tag (e.g. a number, a nonce or a protocol identifier) to each plaintext before encrypting it and removing the tag after decryption. Tagging a protocol does not introduce additional attacks in the protocol, while preserving its commucation goals.
In the previous sections, we have shown how to compose protocols which do not share cryptographic primitives. In this section, we show that protocols which do share common cryptographic primitives, such as encryption and hash functions, can also be securely composed in the same manner, as long as the two protocols are tagged differently.
Our proof technique relies on our previous theorems, in that we show that an attack against the composition of two differently tagged protocols can be transformed into an attack where the protocols use different encryption and hash functions. Therefore, tagging essentially enforces the disjointness of the two protocols.
Even though we prove this only for symmetric encryption and hash functions, our technique can be extended in a straigtforward manner to other usual cryptographic primitives such as asymmetric encryption and digital signature. Other cryptographic primitives can pose more problems (for example it is not obvious if/how the eXclusive OR can be tagged). It is an interesting open problem to give a generic definition of tagging and characterize which cryptographic primitives can be tagged.
We consider protocols over the signature F enc,h = {enc, dec, h} where enc and dec model respectively encryption and decryption and are of arity 2 and h models a hash function and is of arity 1. We also consider the signatures F In order to define tagging, we first consider the signature renaming transformation c (c ∈ {a, b}) which assigns to a protocol P over F enc,h a protocol P c (c ∈ {a, b}) in the signature F c enc,h such that the two protocols are identical modulo bijective renaming of functions symbols (enc, dec and h are transformed into enc c , dec c and respectively h c and this transformation is extended homomorphically to the entire protocol). out(dec a (x, y) ).
For c ∈ {a, b} we consider a tagging function symbol tag c and an untagging function symbol untag c contained in the signature F c = {tag c , untag c } (where both function symbols have arity 1). The role of the tag c function is to tag its argument with the tag c. Typically, this means appending c to the argument but the precise implementation of the tagging function does not need to be specified. The role of the untag c function is to remove the tag. To model this interaction between tag c and untag c we consider the equational theories E c = {untag c (tag c (x)) = x} (for c ∈ {a, b}).
If A ∈ {in(x), out(t), νx, x := t, s = t} is an atomic action over F c enc,h (with c ∈ {a, b}), we let [|A|] be a linear process over F enc,h ∪ F c denoting the c-tagged version of A, defined as follows:
where H(t) tags the term t with c as defined below:
name or a variable
and where tests c (t) is a sequence of tests which ensure that every decryption and every untagging performed by the protocol is successful:
The transformation [| |] is extended homomorphically to composed processes.
Example 6: Continuing Example 5, we have that
Finally, we have that
Note that before performing the decryption, the process [|P a |] verifies that the received term is a valid encryption and that the underlying plain-text has been correctly tagged.
Our next lemma shows why tagging two protocols is essentially the same as forcing them to use disjoint equational theories. It allows us to reduce the security problem for differently tagged processes to the security problem for processes which use disjoint equational theories. Proof: The technique (detailed in [13] ) consists in transforming a trace leading to an attack on R into a trace leading to an attack on W .
Furthermore, we have that if a protocol is secure then its c-tagged version is secure.
Lemma 8: If P is a protocol over
We can now state a generic theorem, in the spirit of Theorem 1, but for tagged protocols.
Let P = P 1 · . . . · P n be a linear process over F enc,h with free variables {x 1 , . . . , x p } where P i is an atomic process (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let Q = Q 1 · . . . · Q m be a linear process over F enc,h with free variables {y 1 , . . . , y q } where Q i is an atomic process (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
We consider R a untagged copy of R where the shared variables of P and Q are duplicated as in Theorem 1 such that P and Q access disjoint variables. More precisely, let R = R 1 · . . . · R n+m be such that:
for some j and where x ranges over all variables in P j 2)
for some j and where x ranges over all variables in Q j We consider an execution of the composition of [|P
Then we have:
Theorem 4: Assume ϕ 0 t for any t ∈ {x 1 σ 0 , . . . , x p σ 0 , y 1 σ 0 , . . . , y q σ 0 } and that
is a run in the equational theory E enc and such that: 1) if ϕ t for some t ∈ {x i σ, y j σ | x i , y j ∈ dom(σ)}, then ϕ Eenc s for some s ∈ {x
In this tagged setting, the above theorem intuitively states that any trace on the tagged composition of two protocols can be transformed into a trace of the un-tagged composition, but where the two protocols no longer share secrets.
Example 7:
We illustrate the above theorem with an example where the untagged composition of two protocols is not secure. However, using the theorem, we can conclude that the tagged composition is secure.
We consider the two processes
previously defined in Section III-A. We have seen that νx · νy · (x := x ) · (y := y ) · Q 2 preserves the secrecy of z, while the sequential composition P 1 · Q 2 (where P 1 is used to create the keys x and y) does not preserve the secrecy of z. However, the sequential composition [|P We can also use Theorem 4 to prove tagged variants of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3:
Theorem 5 (Tagged version of Theorem 2):
Theorem 6 (Tagged version of Theorem 3):
Let P = νk 1 · . . . · νk n ·!(P 1 | P 2 ) be a process over F enc,h and let
. Theorems 5 and 6 allow us to securely compose keyexchange protocols which make use of symmetric encryption with protocols which use the exchanged keys, as long as the two protocols are tagged differently and if they obey the security requirements detailed above.
We have seen that Example 7 explains the need to tag encryption in order to obtain secure composition. One might think that tagging encryptions is sufficient to ensure the security of the composition and that it is not necessary to tag the hash function as well. Unfortunately, this is not true. We end this section by an example which illustrates why tagging is necessary for the hash function as well.
Example 8:
We have that the protocol P does not reveal x. The protocol νx · Q reveals neither z nor x. However, if P is used to instantiate the variable x for Q, we have that
By Theorem 4, we have however that the tagged composition does satisfy the secret of z:
VI. RELATED WORK
There are two large classes of models for studying the security of cryptographic protocols. On one hand, there are the Dolev-Yao (also called symbolic) models, in which messages sent over the network are represented by terms and the attacker is modeled as a deduction system. On the other hand, there are the computational (or cryptographic) models, in which the messages are bit-strings and the attacker is an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine.
Our result clearly belongs to the first approach. One of the first papers studying the composition of protocols in the symbolic model is [16] . In this paper, Guttman and Thayer show that (in the formalism of strand spaces [21] ) two protocols which make use of concatenation and encryption can be safely executed together without damaging interactions, as soon as the protocols are "independent". Also, an assumption is made that all keys are atomic and not generated for example by hashing some message. The independence hypothesis requires in particular that the sets of encrypted messages handled by the two protocols be disjoint. This is a semantic hypothesis on all possible executions of the two protocols which needs to be checked by hand.
In [17] , Cortier et al show that tagging is sufficient to avoid collusion between protocols sharing common keys and making use of standard cryptographic primitives: concatenation, signature, hash functions and encryption. This framework allows to compose processes in parallel; however, it does not allow to securely compose e.g. a key exchange protocol with another protocol which makes use of the shared key. In particular, this is because the shared keys should never appear as payloads.
In [22] , Guttman provides a characterization which ensures that two protocols can run securely together when sharing some data such as keys or payloads. The main improvement over [16] is that keys are allowed to be non-atomic. The characterization is syntactic but has to be computed for each pair of protocols. As cryptographic primitives, the protocols are allowed to contain encryptions and concatenations. The proof method in our result is roughly similar to the proof methods described here: an attack against the composition is transformed into an attack against one of the two protocols.
In [23] , Delaune et al use a derivative of the applied-π calculus to model off-line guessing attacks. They show that in the passive case resistance against guessing attacks is preserved by the composition of two protocols which share the weak secret against which the attack is mounted. This result (in the passive case) holds for arbitrary equational theories. However, for the active case this is no longer the case: it is however proven that tagging the weak secret enforces secure composition (in the sense of guessing attacks). Again, this framework applies to parallel composition only.
Mödersheim and Viganò [24] have proposed a framework for composing protocols sequentially. They propose a criterion for a protocol P 1 to safely use P 2 as a sub-protocol (for implementing a secure channel). However, their criterion is a semantic criterion, for which no decision procedure has been provided yet.
In [25] , Delaune et al use a simulation based approach inspired from the computational model to provide a framework for securely composing protocols in the applied-π calculus. This involves defining for each sub-protocol an ideal functionality and then showing that a certain implementation securely emulates the ideal functionality.
Another line of work is represented by the Protocol Composition Logic [26] , which can be used to modularly prove security properties of protocols using a fixed set of primitives. In order to safely compose two protocols, one has to check that each protocol satisfies some invariant used in the security proof of the other protocol. While offering more flexibility, this criteria is not syntactic and needs to be checked each time by hand.
As opposed to [16] , [17] , [22] , [24] , [26] , our result allows not only the standard cryptographic primitives like encryption and hash functions, but arbitrary primitives expressible as equational theories. Furthermore, unlike [17] , [23] , our result allows to compose protocols asymmetrically (i.e. not just in parallel). The main difference between our approach and [25] is that we do not need to prove anything about the protocols to be composed, except standard reachability properties. In particular, we do not have to provide a key exchange functionality and prove that an implementation satisfies this functionality. However, [25] can be used to reason about protocols which do share primitives.
In the context of computational models, Canetti et al. have developed the Universal Composability framework [27] , designed to allow composition. In this framework, an ideal functionality is defined and a specific protocol is shown to implement this functionality securely. Then this protocol may be securely used instead of the functionality. This approach is compositional in the sense that the protocol can be safely used instead of the functionality in any context (possibly inside other protocols/functions). However, as pointed out in [28] , this framework does not allow a priori to compose protocols sharing data such as keys. Some specific results have been further developed in order to allow composition with "joint state" [28] . These results allow e.g. several sessions of a protocol (sharing common data such as keys and random coins) to be considered independently (each session having fresh keys and randomness). However, the shared data have to be used in the same manner in each copies. It is not possible for example to use this approach for composing a protocol that uses a key for encrypting date with a protocol that uses the same key as payload (even if the key remains secret), as it is done in our work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proven that protocols can be securely composed provided that they use primitives modeled by disjoint equational theories or provided that their common primitives are tagged encryptions or tagged hash functions.
Our result is a generic composition result: any trace leading to an attack on the composition of the two protocols is transformed into a trace that leads to an attack in one of the individual protocols, even if the two protocols share secrets such as keys. This allows us to securely perform several kinds of compositions. We can consider secure parallel composition under shared secrets as well as asymmetric composition, where one of the protocols is used as a subprotocol. Actually, our combination theorem can be used in any context where two protocols are arbitrarily interleaved.
As an application, we have shown how our main composition theorem can be used in order to securely refine a protocol that uses pre-established keys or secure channels.
For the sake of simplicity, the only security property that we have considered is secrecy. We believe however that our result extends to general trace properties (e.g. authentication). This is because our trace transformation proof technique transforms any trace of the composition of two protocols under shared secrets (as long as a shared key is not revealed) into a trace on the composition under no shared secrets. This means that any violation of authentication in the composed protocol would be transformed into a violation of authentication on one of the individual protocols.
We intend to develop a logic for trace properties which are preserved by our composition theorem. We are also investigating whether composition with disjoint equational theories preserves trace equivalence, as defined e.g. in [29] and more generally behavioral equivalences which can be used to reason about security properties such as anonymity.
We have proven that primitives can be shared between the protocols provided they are tagged, in the case of symmetric encryption and hash. We think that our proof technique easily extends to any classical destructor/constructor theories (e.g. signatures and asymmetric encryption).
There are certain primitives which seem harmless enough that they may be shared without tagging them. For example, the concatenation defined through the equational theory:
fst(pair(x, y)) = x snd(pair(x, y)) = y.
is a candidate. However, let us consider the processes P = νx · νy · z := pair(x, y) Q = νk · out(enc(z, k)) · in(y)· out(pair(fst(dec(y, k)), snd(dec(y, k)))).
The process νz · Q does not reveal z. However, we have that P ·Q does reveal z. This is because Q was only verified secure when z is instantiated to a name. We are trying to prove that the equational theory of pair can be safely shared between two protocols as long as neither of the protocols instantiates a shared key to a pair.
Finally, many relevant equational theories are not so easy to tag. In particular, tagging exclusive or is particularly difficult. Finding a way to securely compose two protocols which both make use of this primitive (the exclusive or) is a challenging open problem.
